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Technological complexity, market demands, and uncertainty have led firms to involve 
external sources of innovation – customers, suppliers, public and private research labs – in 
complex product development for the last three decades.1 While the idea is attractive, there 
are many cases where such outsourcing of Research and Development (henceforth R&D) has 
led to failures and problems, ranging from the aircraft industry with the Boeing Dreamliner 
and the Airbus A380 (Kotha & Srikanth, 2013) to the automotive industry (Zirpoli & Becker, 
2011a)2.  
Received wisdom and much of the research literature see the principal reasons for such 
failures in the growing complexity and the coordination challenges that come with involving 
external parties (Kotha & Srikanth, 2013; Larsen et al., 2013), as well as in increased 
																																																						
1 This article is a joint endeavor. The listing of author names is alphabetical. 
2 In this paper we focus on the outsourcing of R&D activities that concern later stages of the whole R&D 
process, i.e. the new product development process (Clark, 1989). We will not make reference to basic or pure 
R&D activities that are not directly related to the development of new products, nor to manufacturing tasks 
(thus, we are not concerned with outsourcing manufacturing).  
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cooperation problems (e.g., Dyer, 1996). Consequently, according to prior research, failure 
could be avoided by employing sophisticated coordination and governance mechanisms, such 
as co-located teams, benchmarking and value engineering techniques, ICT tools, and other 
“best” relational practice in a Toyota-like fashion (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Womack et al., 
1990, Nishiguchi, 1994, Ragatz et al., 1997, Helper et al, 2000, MacDuffie, 2013).  
This diagnosis misses a crucial point in understanding the persistent failures and problems 
with R&D outsourcing, however: the role of learning by doing for developing R&D 
competences (Weigelt, 2009, Zirpoli and Becker, 2011a, 2011b). Literature has shown that 
outsourcing can lead to the hollowing out of corporations and the depreciation of internal 
capabilities (Hamel, 1991; Bettis et al., 1992, Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). If the capabilities in 
question are integrative capabilities, i.e., for integrating systems and components developed 
by suppliers and other external sources of innovation (Brusoni et al., 2001; Takeishi, 2001, 
2002), their lack can explain problems with R&D outsourcing. Pisano and Teece (2007: 294) 
highlight this point when they write ‘vertical disintegration sharpens the need and enhances 
the difficulties of systems integration, as it requires integrating the activities of parties when 
there is no common ownership link. Interface standards and modularity, of course, facilitate 
outsourcing and thereby sharpen requirements for integration. Failure at integration in turn 
destroys any benefits associated with outsourcing in the first place ... Possession of the 
systems integration capabilities gives high-tech firms outsourcing choices …With respect to 
complex systems, system integration capabilities could indeed become the bottleneck asset’. 
In this respect, extant literature has highlighted that the main problem with extreme design 
and engineering outsourcing is that it can weaken firms’ ability to understand the components 
of a product. This, in turn, can weaken the understanding of the ways in which components 
are integrated into systems and how to manage systems integration, that is, the firm’s 
architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990, Lincoln et al., 1998, Brusoni et al., 
2001; Takeishi, 2001, 2002; Zirpoli & Becker, 2011a, b). As the literature has demonstrated, a 
key prerequisite for maintaining such integrative capabilities, especially in their tacit form, is 
learning by doing (Leonard-Barton, 1988; Attewell, 1992; Weigelt, 2009; Weigelt & Sarkar, 
2012). Learning by doing is, therefore, a necessary requirement for developing and 
maintaining integrative capabilities.  
Prominent examples of a successful involvement of suppliers in NPD processes (e.g. the 
Toyota Motor Company case) provide support to the centrality of competence and learning 
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issues in R&D outsourcing. Literature has clarified, for example, that Toyota succeeded in 
R&D outsourcing not only, and not primarily, because of an exemplary implementation of 
coordination and governance tools but also because it never fell into the trap of becoming 
dependent on suppliers for key component knowledge (Fine and Whitney, 1996, Fine, 1998). 
Contrary to what is often believed, the Toyota case shows that coordination and governance 
mechanisms become a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful implementation of 
R&D outsourcing. Failures and problems of R&D outsourcing, in fact, can arise even though 
optimal governance tools are in place, when the system integrator lacks component specific 
know how (Takeishi, 2001).  
Companies developing complex products, hence, face a crucial dilemma: the much-cited 
benefits of R&D outsourcing such as cost benefits, access to deep specialist knowledge or 
shorter development lead times, are often traded-off with the risk of negative consequences 
for competence development due to the loss of opportunities for learning by doing (Weigelt, 
2009). This paper contributes to understanding how firms can tackle such a trade-off and 
provides insights on how firms can organize R&D to protect against competence loss in R&D 
outsourcing. Most importantly, we identify a novel solution not yet identified in prior 
research. While this trade-off has been identified in recent research (e.g., Grimpe and Kaiser, 
2010), what solutions can be used to address it is still unclear, even though such solutions are 
urgently needed.  
The case of Fiat Auto is particularly well suited for this purpose. Fiat offers a striking 
example of the problems that R&D outsourcing can generate3. Most importantly, it also offers 
a novel answer to the question, and a novel solution for how to organize R&D outsourcing to 
protect against competence loss (i.e., assure learning despite outsourcing). Fiat managed to 
significantly mitigate the learning trade-off and improve its new product development 
performance when it started distinguishing between two types of product development 
projects and alternating them over time: a first type of project (“template”) in which Fiat 
focused on learning about key component technologies and their interdependences with the 
rest of the product; a second type (“derivative”) in which Fiat could economize on the use of 
internal engineering resources and devolve to suppliers most of the design and engineering 
tasks. The novelty of Fiat’s approach consists in explicitly applying different task allocation 
																																																						
3 For a full account of Fiat’s fall, rise and transformation at the turn of the century see Whitford and Zirpoli, 
2016. 
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schemes over time, and thereby, explicitly employing the time dimension in the division of 
labor, thus making it dynamic rather than static.  
In the remainder of the paper, after a brief recap of the state of the art knowledge on the 
problems of R&D outsourcing and the solutions for coping with them, we synthesize the 
strategic re-orientation and re-organization of the product innovation process at Fiat that 
contributed to recovering from its problems without back-sourcing. We then show Fiat’s 
solution to the persistent problem with R&D outsourcing, a novel solution not yet 
documented in extant research. Finally, we discuss the lesson learnt and identify an 
alternative to existing forms of organizing R&D outsourcing without incurring some of its 
negative consequences.  
The antecedents and implications of R&D outsourcing from a competence perspective 
Firms’ competences, NPD costs and strategic flexibility are the usual motivations of R&D 
outsourcing decisions (Clark, 1989): allocating R&D tasks to outside parties enables tapping 
into the deep competences as well as economies of scale and scope of specialized supplier 
firms, and can be a response to the challenge of having to master an increasing number of 
technologies in multi-technology products (Granstrand, Patel & Pavitt, 1997).   
Outsourcing decisions, however, also have a dynamic effect and longer-term consequences on 
learning (Teece and Pisano, 1994, Jacobides and Winter, 2005), problem solving processes 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991), and firms’ abilities to evaluate, assimilate and apply new 
knowledge (‘absorptive capacity’, Cohen and Levithal, 1990). Absorptive capacity is required 
to leverage knowledge that is not held by the firm. It is one of the most important building 
blocks of a firm’s ability to successfully implement an R&D outsourcing strategy. Allocating 
tasks to outside parties can deteriorate absorptive capacity because it diminishes the firm’s 
knowledge, one of the antecedents of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). This 
point is clearly made, for example, by Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt (2001). They show that 
there exists a complex link between what firms make and what firms know and their ability to 
act as system integrators. Leveraging external sources of innovation, in fact, has a profound 
impact on the firm’s learning processes and competences. The reason is that the allocation of 
tasks along the supply chain implicitly allocates learning opportunities (Takeishi, 2001). 
Where the knowledge to be learned is tacit – for instance, in the case of integrative 
capabilities (Weigelt, 2009) such as how to integrate components into a high-performing 
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system like a car that does not vibrate at high speeds –, it can only be acquired through 
learning by doing (Argote and Epple, 1990, Weigelt, 2009, Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). 
Learning by doing is, therefore, a key aspect for developing a firm’s absorptive capacity. The 
deterioration and lack of integrative capabilities, in turn, generates negative consequences 
such as problems in evaluating systems or monitoring suppliers (Lincoln et al., 1998).  
The short- and long-term consequences of outsourcing innovation tasks to external parties are, 
therefore, in a trade-off relationship: R&D outsourcing enables tapping into the competences 
of external specialists and immediate cost cutting benefits but increases the risk of losing the 
learning opportunities required for maintaining integrative and monitoring capabilities that are 
needed in integrating the inputs of external parties. In the long term, hence, R&D outsourcing 
might produce negative consequences on problem-solving processes, absorptive capacity and 
learning, and in turn, on overall R&D costs (see the case of Fiat below and Reitzig & Wagner 
(2010) and Larsen et al. (2013) for contexts other than outsourcing R&D).  
Put in this light relational practices appear as complements rather than substitutes for learning 
and for sharing knowledge with suppliers. The “system integrator” firm can, in fact, suffer 
from difficulties in integrating suppliers’ product development activities even though it has 
implemented organizational measures due to a lack of component specific knowledge 
(Lincoln et al., 1998, Takeishi, 2001). As our own research shows, a number of prerequisites 
need to be in place for learning and knowledge sharing to happen (Zirpoli & Becker, 2011a, 
b). For instance, if engineers are occupied with project management and do not actually 
engage in profound technical discussions with suppliers’ engineers (perhaps because of time 
pressures), there is no learning and competence development even despite co-location4. 
Rather, the negative consequences of deteriorating absorptive capacity and integrative 
capabilities materialize. As it turns out, while there are other forms of learning, learning by 
doing is a form of learning that companies developing complex products cannot do without 
(Weigelt, 2009, Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010, Zirpoli & Becker, 2011a, 2011b). Outsourcing 
development tasks in principle ships off opportunities for learning by doing, leaving 
unattended the dynamic and long-term leg of the trade-off that has not been on the radar very 
much so far.  
																																																						
4 Co-location is considered a fundamental organizational solution for successfully implementing suppliers’ 
involvement in NPD processes (Ragatz et al., 1997). 
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What then, can firms do to avoid they stop learning when they outsource development tasks, 
and to assure they develop their competences further and maintain absorptive capacity and 
integrative capabilities? In short, how can firms organize to learn despite outsourcing?  
The Toyota model 
Toyota is often cited as the example of how firms can preserve and even improve integrative 
capabilities while involving external sources of innovation in R&D processes. How has 
Toyota avoided these problems? Much attention has been focused on analyzing how Toyota 
governs its suppliers (Asanuma, 1992, Liker et al.,1995, Dyer, 1996, Nishiguchi & 
Brookfield, 1997, Edwards & Samini, 1997, Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Indeed, the 
coordination and governance mechanisms Toyota uses have inspired many other firms 
(Turnbull et al., 1992). However, explaining Toyota success in managing R&D outsourcing 
only on the basis of its exemplar implementation of coordination and governance mechanisms 
would be a mistake. 
The seminal work on R&D outsourcing by Fine and Whitney (1996) highlights that Toyota’s 
approach towards outsourcing differs from that of other carmakers as Toyota was careful to 
assure that the involvement of suppliers in its NPD process was never at the expense of the 
development and maintenance of component specific knowledge. Toyota has never become 
dependent on suppliers’ knowledge and has, over time, maintained tight control of process 
and product technologies. These latter are never fully outsourced, but rather, are still 
developed in house (e.g. tools and equipment design and other component technology). This 
account of Toyota’s approach is consistent with general advice on how to preserve system 
integration capabilities or architectural knowledge provided by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), 
Henderson and Clark, (1990) and Takeishi (2001). Indeed, involving suppliers at Toyota does 
not mean outsourcing R&D competences but rather sharing knowledge with suppliers and 
cutting cost of product development and supply chain management (Nishiguchi, 1994, 
Takeishi and Fujimoto, 2003, Helper and Sako, 1995, Takeishi, 2001, 2002, Nobeoka and 
Cusumano, 1997). For this reason Toyota developed ad hoc coordination mechanisms and 
techniques (Helper et al, 2000).  
The Toyota case, hence, cannot be taken as a “clear cut” example of R&D outsourcing as it 
requires high in-house R&D investments to gain full control of component specific and 
architectural knowledge. As a consequence, beyond the implementation of Toyota’s relational 
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practices with suppliers, firms who want to imitate Toyota should substantially limit R&D 
outsourcing. This option is not only difficult to implement but also not available to firms that, 
having outsourced R&D, are stuck in the learning problems described above and have no time 
and resources to back-source design and engineering tasks. How, then, can firms organize 
R&D outsourcing to address the trade-off and avoid the negative consequences of R&D 
outsourcing without back-sourcing?  
The Fiat case: a novel solution born out of necessity 
This is precisely the question that Fiat Auto faced. Interestingly, it managed to find and 
implement an answer, and thus, to organize in such a way that it keeps learning despite 
outsourcing. Fiat came up with an organizational innovation that is a typical instance of a case 
in which “necessity is the mother of innovation” (Bolton, 1993): for reaping the benefits of 
learning by doing in a situation in which it could not increase its internal staff or back-source 
the design and engineering tasks, Fiat had to find another way out. It adopted a new 
organizational solution that goes beyond the ones known in the literature, offering a novel 
solution that worked in Fiat’s case when others were not available. Drawing on our 15-year 
research project at Fiat Auto, we now describe the solution they found, and subsequently 
analyze it to draw lessons for other firms.5 
Long-term consequences of R&D outsourcing hit home 
From 1996 onwards, Fiat had massively stepped up outsourcing of product development tasks 
to suppliers. At the same time, Fiat had also given suppliers an ever increasing role in the 
development process: they were included earlier in the process; they were given larger 
responsibilities; and they were considered strategic partners6. Fiat was engaged in a move 
from co-designing components and systems with suppliers to outsourcing R&D to system and 
module suppliers and eventually, a tiered supply structure where ideally, Fiat had relations 
																																																						
5 We collected archival data to understand the characteristics of the sector and the history of the selected 
companies, and carried out extensive semi-structured interviews with managers in Fiat, Fiat’s two research 
centers, and 16 of Fiat’s first-tier suppliers. Between 1997 and 2008, we carried out 79 interviews with managers 
and engineers belonging to 19 different companies, totaling about 145 hours (see appendix). Of particular 
importance for this paper is the data gathering campaign of 2006-2008. We  selected information in order to 
provide the possibility of triangulation (e.g., by combining the perspectives of top management with fine-
grained, micro-level details concerning the execution of the new product development process provided by 
people directly involved in this process). All interviews were taped and transcribed. Our unit of analysis was the 
new product development project. 
6 In a 1998 article in an academic journal, Roberto Testore, Fiat CEO at the time, provides a synthesis of Fiat’s 
approach (Testore, 1998). 
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only with the system and module suppliers and only those, in turn, relations to lower-tier 
suppliers.  
Fiat reached an exceptional level of engineering and design outsourcing: Fiat’s suppliers 
engineered up to 85% (in terms of value) of the components of new car models value at the 
end of the 1990s7. Between 1996 and 2001, Fiat was one of the firms with the highest degree 
of outsourcing of design and engineering in the automotive industry (see also MacDuffie, 
2013)8. Specifically, Fiat outsourced the design of most major components and systems with 
the sole exception of engines, metal sheets, chassis and suspensions. For the components and 
systems outsourced Fiat did not have “in-house” design and engineering facilities but only 
engineers responsible for dealing with the suppliers during NPD projects (e.g., for 
dashboards). This approach was premised on modularity9 and completely consistent with the 
prescriptions in the literature at the time (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, Sturgeon 2002, Fixson et. 
al, 2008).  
Fiat’s problem was the result of (1) assuming that the product architecture was more modular 
than it was in reality, (2) relying, in turn, too much on the coordination properties of standard 
interfaces among components and systems, (3) missing exposure to learning about 
components and systems development tasks due to their complete outsourcing to suppliers 
and (4), as a consequence, gradually losing component specific knowledge (Zirpoli & Becker, 
2011a, b; on modularity, its use and limits in the auto industry see also MacDuffie, 2013 and 
Jacobides et al. 2015). Indeed, Fiat’s lack of technical skills on component technologies 
resulted in fuzzy and incomplete specifications to suppliers in early stages of the development 
process. Insufficient specifications often led to costly re-design that, in turn, resulted in longer 
lead times and overall poor project performance. A very high degree of design outsourcing 
thus did not alter system integration capabilities per se. However, extreme outsourcing led to 
																																																						
7 This figure also considers NPD competences that Fiat could control through suppliers it owned such as 
Magneti Marelli and Teksid. 
8 See Di Minin et al. 2010 on Fiat’s strategy related to basic R&D outsourcing. In Fiat, basic R&D activities 
were traditionally carried over by the Centro Ricerche Fiat (CRF) that was part of the Fiat Group but was not 
directly involved in development of new products. As observed by Di Minin et al., the CRF has itself embarked 
in an outsourcing process confirming the outsourcing trend also for basic R&D activities. In our interviews in the 
mid 2000s Fiat top management confirmed that CRF experienced a declining centrality in Fiat’s overall R&D 
processes during the 90s and is nowadays completely peripheral in the R&D activities of Fiat Chrysler (FCA).  
9  Modularity refers to a decomposition scheme that assumes independence between modules, with 
interdependences confined within modules’ boundaries (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Some parts of the literature 
have suggested that modular product architecture can serve as a good map for the decomposition of the 
development task and task allocation (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). 
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difficulties in obtaining the desired product performance at the expected cost, lead times and 
quality levels, resulting in project performance that did not meet expectations.  
Fiat realized that such performance problems were caused – at least to some degree – by its 
extreme outsourcing strategy and its attempt to pursue a modular design strategy for a product 
whose architecture is substantially integral. One manager explained the roots of Fiat’s 
problems as follows: 
‘We realized you cannot integrate components performances you know very little about. ... if 
you have never designed a component or a system it will be very difficult to understand the 
subtle interactions with the rest of the vehicle“ (Fiat Auto, 2006).  
Fiat urgently needed to react in order to re-build lost competences and gain new competences. 
It is here that the Fiat Auto case provides extraordinary insights into how to learn despite 
outsourcing: Fiat managed to adapt its organization to learn despite outsourcing, thus 
recovering and providing one important component of its turnaround over the past years. We 
now turn to describing this novel organization of R&D outsourcing. 
A new rationale for R&D outsourcing 
At the beginning of 2000 when Fiat started considering the option of reversing its outsourcing 
strategy, Fiat’s product portfolio was shrinking while other carmakers were developing brand 
new market segments. Moreover, its market share was declining and its financial results were 
so poor that the company went close to bankruptcy in 2004 (Volpato and Zirpoli, 2011). To 
bounce back on the markets, Fiat needed to refresh product lines and step up its introduction 
of new models on the market. It neither had money to invest in sufficient internal engineering 
resources nor much time to react. Fiat had to do more with less, and had to do it fast. But it 
found itself between a rock and a hard place: the two major options – building up staff or 
backsourcing – were out of the question. One of our informants synthesized the situation in 
which Fiat was in the early 2000s as follows: 
‘We should have reversed our strategy by integrating back competences that we had lost. We 
had two problems, however, no money and no time’ (Fiat Auto, 2006).  
Fiat thus had to select what to focus its engineering resources on. A solution was found only 
in 2005 after the appointment of a new CEO and Chief Technology Officer. Fiat started from 
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revising the criteria to decide which development tasks its engineers would focus on, and 
which ones were outsourced to suppliers. First, Fiat looked at which performance dimensions 
of a car its customers valued most – such as overall ride comfort, road behavior, safety and so 
on. For any given component, it considered how important an impact that component had on 
the most important performance dimensions. For instance, how important is the design of the 
suspension system, the air-conditioning system or the braking system for overall ride comfort 
or road behavior? Second, Fiat considered the interdependences between any given 
component and the rest of the vehicle. Is the air-conditioning or safety system interdependent 
with the engine, the door seals, and so on? Fiat took a decision to make sure that it developed 
and maintained product development competences for such components that scored high on 
both criteria. For components that scored high on one of the criteria, it outsourced 
development but remained involved in different ways. For components and systems that have 
a high impact on a performance dimension that customers value highly but that have low 
interdependence with the rest of the vehicle, Fiat outsources the development but provides 
very detailed specifications. For components and systems that have a low impact on a 
performance dimension that customers value highly but that have high interdependence with 
the rest of the vehicle, Fiat co-designs the system with the supplier who holds the specialist 
knowledge on the component or system. For components or systems that score low on both 
counts, Fiat outsources the development, providing only broad specifications10 (see Figure 1). 
  Prioritization of a component’s impact on overall product performance 
  Low High 
Level of 
interdependences 
between the 
component and the 
rest of the product 
 
Low 
 Delegate the overall 
system development and 
provide broad 
specifications 
(e.g., A/C system) 
 
Provide very detailed 
specifications but 
outsource the system 
development  
(e.g. Braking system) 
 
High 
Co-design the system but 
the supplier holds the 
component specific 
knowledge 
(e.g. Safety system) 
 
Develop design 
competences in-house  
(e.g. 
Suspension/handling) 
 
																																																						
10 On the mapping of interdependencies between the elements of a design see MacCormack et al., 2006. 
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Figure 1: Criteria for outsourcing product development tasks  
By matching the “level of interdependences between component and the rest of the product” 
and the “component’s impact on overall product performance”, Fiat found more differentiated 
criteria for the “make or buy” decision that proved more informative than the usual 
considerations on costs or technical interdependences it had made before. This, more 
generally, underlined the need for managers to elaborate a clear performance prioritization 
(e.g. internal learning, learning from suppliers, cost cutting, etc.) before taking decisions that 
are purely dictated by engineering opportunity.  
This approach helped Fiat to re-focus its R&D outsourcing decisions. However, Fiat’s 
managers realized that Fiat still had a substantial lack of engineering resources to design and 
engineer in house all the components corresponding to the “darker” area of Figure 1 for every 
project under development, starting with its bottom right quadrant. This leads us to the second 
building block of Fiat’s recovery strategy: the template system. 
The template system  
To address limitations that did not permit it to take on all development work in the bottom 
right-hand cell of Figure 1 above, Fiat introduced a distinction of two types of products, and 
linked them to two different type of development projects: template models and derivative 
models. In developing the template model, Fiat designed and engineered all the most 
important systems of the model. It subsequently used that model as a template to design and 
engineer derivative products in the same market segment. In this way, Fiat realized it was 
possible to outsource the complete development of entire vehicles for derivative projects 
without incurring the problems it had experienced in the past. When it developed a template 
model, Fiat continued to involve system suppliers but it was fully responsible for the 
engineering and the application of all the most relevant systems in the vehicle. In both cases, 
system and component suppliers provide complete systems. However, the extent to which Fiat 
got involved in the component and system design, and the corresponding engineering and 
design resources invested, changed significantly between template and derivative models. 
In a nutshell, economizing resources through outsourcing and at the same time learning on 
components and systems was made possible by the different task partitioning and allocation 
(Figure 2). In the old system, the overall design tasks were partitioned in components and 
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systems, and some of those were outsourced. This task-partitioning scheme was then applied 
to all vehicles. For instance, dashboards were always outsourced and for no car models did 
Fiat design dashboards in-house. Fiat subsequently experienced erosion in its own 
competences in designing and evaluating such systems. With the template, the design tasks 
corresponding to specific components and systems were no longer outsourced for all models 
and, when outsourced, tasks were not allocated according to the same decomposition scheme 
for all models belonging to the same segment (Figure 2). Fiat assumed the responsibility and 
control for designing all key systems of a template model, and instead partitioned the design 
work to be done along the time dimension, i.e., along car models introduced on the market at 
different points of time: It carried out one model itself, then outsourced the complete design 
of component and system applications of subsequent models. Control is assured by using the 
model it has designed itself as a template for those that will be outsourced. 
 
Figure 2 – Task partitioning system until 2005 (left-hand panel) and after 2005 (right-hand panel) 
A template model embodies components and systems that will play the function of design 
archetypes (examples of design archetypes are the architecture of a suspension for small cars, 
the layout of the panel instruments for sports cars, or the design of the sealing system for 
luxury cars). A design archetype is a set of engineering solutions that will be employed in all 
models belonging to the same segment over time (market, dimension of the vehicle, etc.). In a 
metaphorical sense, this set of design archetypes defines a model that becomes the ‘ancestor’ 
which then gives rise to a family of variant models. This translates into a product 
development team that, for a template model, develops a new car managing the design and 
engineering of all  – as opposed to only some – key systems and components in house. 
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Thereby, Fiat’s engineers get exposed to opportunities for learning by doing relating to the 
full set of design and engineering tasks. In the words of one of the managers involved: 
‘Engineers we staff on template projects hold an above average component specific know 
how. This know how derives from the fact that they themselves develop the key systems. Our 
engineering teams continue to work with suppliers but delegation is not according to black 
box sourcing as before. Learning by doing plays a key role to understand the systems we are 
integrating’ (Fiat Auto, 2007). 
It is worth noting that the template platform does not only have a physical dimension (i.e. a 
set of components, systems and modules carried over on derived models) but also has an 
intangible dimension. The latter allows Fiat to achieve the goal of setting the standard of how 
to solve the typical engineering problems characterizing the development of a product in a 
given market segment, i.e. to set a bundle of design archetypes. Fiat chose to set a bundle of 
archetypes according to market segments because each market segment has its own 
characteristics in terms of the key performances that customers are interested in. Archetypical 
engineering solutions (e.g. how to design and engineer a suspension or the layout of the 
interiors) vary accordingly. This observation links back to the quote reported above 
emphasizing the centrality in system integration of overall product performance integration. 
The description of what characterizes template projects adds further evidence on this point: 
‘Template projects are a means to learn about key technological interdependences and on how to 
manage key performance trade-offs’ (Fiat Auto, 2007) 
Following a template also has the implication that every time a derivative project is started 
within a segment, engineers will have to apply the template solution from the template model 
(the segment’s ‘ancestor’). By using the template system, hence, Fiat also pursues the goal of 
increasing component and system standardization, i.e. designs systems and components of a 
template model to be carried over to derivative models. In practice, however, even though 
engineers should carry over the same components as much as possible, they often just scale 
the archetypical solution up or down (i.e. implement the same archetypes – e.g. the shape of a 
door closure system – but in a different physical dimension, in the engineering jargon 
“component mathematics”). Scalability is a feature that distinguishes templates (archetypical 
solutions) from platforms understood as, for instance, standardized under-bodies for cars11. As 
																																																						
11 Nobeoka and Cusumano (1997), for instance, describe a car platform as consisting of the floor panels, 
suspension system, firewall, and rocker panels. 
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the quote above highlights, templates serve the primary goal of providing learning and 
competence development and are not always used for leveraging economies of scale through 
standardization.12 
 
The impact of the template system on Fiat’s NPD performance 
In the words of one of our interviewees, “template projects are a means to learn”. Do they 
also contribute to boosting NPD performance? Following the literature, we have assessed the 
impact of the new system on costs and lead times (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Our interviews 
and data indicate that the move towards the new logic for assigning development tasks held 
the key to economizing on the overall amount of resources invested in the product 
development process and, at the same time, to achieving unprecedented time-to-market in all 
product development projects, both template and derivative. In Figure 3 we show the impact 
of the new strategy on R&D spending at Fiat taking the comparison of four models belonging 
to the same market segment (the “C” segment) as an example. The Fiat Stilo, launched in 
2001, was the baseline and the template for the development of the Fiat Bravo and of the 
Lancia Delta. The Giulietta was the template car for the C segment, replacing the Stilo after 
approximately ten years (this also explains why the cost of development increased), and was 
the baseline for the development of the Dodge Dart. As far as the lead-time performance is 
concerned, the development of the Bravo took just 18 months, 8 months less than the Fiat 
Stilo. Similar figures regard the Lancia Delta and the Dodge Dart.  
																																																						
12 In selecting the car model that will become a template model, factors such as profit margins per unit do, of 
course, also matter. As we describe, the predominant criteria in the choice of template models that we observed 
were the characteristics of the model with regard to what are the key systems for the performance dimensions 
that customers value in that market segment, and whether new competences needed to be acquired in order to 
design models with high performance in these dimensions. 
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Figure 3 – R&D and Capex product-related spending (Source: Fiat Auto Investor’s Day Presentation) 
How did the template system contribute to such performance improvements? The answer is 
that Fiat managed to combine a “scale effect” and a “learning effect”. The first originates in 
the possibility of standardizing components. The second derives from the allocation of design 
tasks and responsibilities in template projects. This provides learning opportunities regarding 
the integration of systems and components that have high impact on performance dimensions 
that customers value highly but that are also highly interdependent with the rest of the car (see 
Figure 1 above). These learning opportunities concern exactly the competences of developing 
those components and systems that have the strategically most important impact on the 
performance of the car. Thus, the template enabled Fiat to take more influence in technical 
discussions and leave less influence to suppliers in decisions that have important 
consequences regarding the technological trajectory13. Fiat also took other organizational 
provisions to ensure that it uses the learning opportunities it has in template projects. For 
instance, a novel type of contract paid suppliers for teaching Fiat specific things, rather than 
by engineering hours or to develop and engineer a certain component.  
																																																						
13 In this way Fiat manages to cope with two problems it experienced before, which contributed to raise NPD 
costs: (1) component over-specification (suppliers were asked to design components with performance higher 
then actually needed); (2) suppliers’ cost and quality monitoring. 
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Discussion: Towards a new frontier of development performance when engaging in 
R&D outsourcing  
The first measure that Fiat took to recover from lost competences following R&D outsourcing 
was premised on a change in the rationale according to which make or by decisions were 
taken: component and system interdependences and their impact on key product performances 
became the most important driver in the make or buy decision. This move followed Fiat’s 
acknowledgement that outsourcing component specific knowledge had been pushed too far 
considering the “integral” nature of the car’s product architecture and the impossibility of 
managing coordination with external sources of innovation just relying on relational practices 
and modularity, without a cutting-edge level of component specific know how (see on both 
points Mac Duffie, 2013, Zirpoli and Becker, 2011a, b). According to these considerations the 
standard reaction should have been to back-source. However, as we reported above, Fiat did 
not have the time, engineering and financial resources to do so.  
The template system was the way that Fiat found to cope with such constraints, i.e. to keep 
R&D outsourcing at high levels, and re-build its integrative capabilities at the same time. The 
template system, hence, played a central role in significantly mitigating the 
outsourcing/learning trade-off, while improving Fiat’s new product development 
performance. In a nutshell, this was possible because Fiat started distinguishing between two 
types of product development projects, corresponding to the development of “template 
models” and “derivative models”. Then Fiat associated to each type of product development 
project a different task allocation along the time dimension. The novelty of Fiat’s approach 
consists in explicitly applying different task allocation schemes over time, and thereby, 
explicitly employing the time dimension in the division of labor, thus making it dynamic 
rather than static.  
In synthesis, Fiat started leveraging two mechanisms: (1) distinguishing project types and (2) 
sequencing project types over time in order to alternate between them: 
(1) Distinguishing project types. The two project types differ with regard to a number of 
characteristics: (a) the criterion for task allocation (learning vs. exploitation of existing 
knowledge), (b) the allocation of development and integration responsibility to the 
focal firm vs. suppliers, (c) the allocation of decision-making authority (Fiat takes 
decisions on architecture vs. on all components that have an impact on key product 
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performance), (d) the competences in focus (competences regarding key 
interdependences between components leading to overall product performance), and 
(e) the learning benefits for the focal firm (on architecture or components vs. on key 
interdependences between components, and on architecture and integration). Viewed 
from the perspective of building component specific and architecture knowledge 
(Takeishi, 2001 and Henderson and Clark, 1990), this shift means that distinguishing 
these two different project types can be used for extending the range of learning 
opportunities across the whole product architecture, thus providing a lever for 
directing learning opportunities towards architectural vs. component-specific 
knowledge. 
(2)  Alternating between learning and derivative projects. Fiat sequentially alternates 
between the two types of project over time, an idea proposed in prior literature in the 
context of attaining ambidexterity (Gulati and Puranam, 2009, Nickerson and Zenger, 
2002, Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003, O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). In combination 
with the lever of distinguishing the two types of project described above, the 
sequencing mechanism provides a project-level mechanism for combining the access 
to specialized knowledge of suppliers and internal learning.  
By jointly implementing the distinction of project types and project sequencing, Fiat managed 
to extend the range along which learning can take place – in order to provide learning 
opportunities concerning the development and integration of components and systems – and 
implement such an extension of the range of learning selectively (i.e., only in some projects). 
Because learning once in a while is sufficient, implementing and adapting project sequencing 
can enable attenuating the trade-off14.  
																																																						
14 In this respect our findings suggest that differentiating template projects and derivative projects and 
sequencing these two project types to alternate between them enables implementing ‘concurrent sourcing’. This 
mechanism has been suggested by Parmigiani (2007). The core insight of ‘concurrent sourcing’ is that it can be 
explained by the fact that a small degree of engaging in an activity is sufficient to get the full benefit associated 
with it (e.g., outsourcing a little suffices to get the full benefits of benchmarking, Parmigiani, 2007). The data 
presented here show this benefit also applies in the context of new product development, where learning once in 
a while can be sufficient to acquire certain competences. Thus, our findings suggest that concurrent sourcing 
extends beyond the manufacturing context it was originally documented in (Parmigiani, 2007). They also extend 
prior research on concurrent sourcing by suggesting that the principle that explains concurrent sourcing is the 
causal mechanism by which project sequencing between learning projects and derivative projects generates 
benefits both for accessing specialized knowledge of suppliers and for internal learning. The learning/derivative 
system thus provides an organizational design parameter that acts on the theoretical construct of project 
sequencing. 
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Fiat also discovered that the learning/derivative system is an organizational mechanism for 
managing linkages between projects that cross firm boundaries. As the evidence suggests, it is 
suitable for projects that cross firm boundaries because (a) engaging in learning projects can 
strengthen firm’s component-specific and architectural knowledge, as well as its skill of 
technical communication with suppliers; (b) developing a template model leads to 
codification of the archetypical solutions, which makes it easier to communicate technical 
details to suppliers; (c) having the finished template model out on the market when the 
development of a derivate is being outsourced to an engineering supplier provides a further 
reference point to clarify the objective of the product development project; and (d) increased 
technical competences as well as communication skills improve monitoring, which enables 
the outsourcing of the development of a whole car model to regional subsidiaries (e.g. Brazil) 
or engineering suppliers15. Figure 4 shows the three-step logic of the new organization for 
product development that Fiat implemented (part 1 and 2) and its impact on project 
performance (part 3). 
																																																						
15 From the perspective of the project and inter-project learning literature, identifying the learning/derivative 
system and its component parts thus also extends prior research by identifying features from inter-firm projects 
that can be used to generate inter-project learning (Prencipe and Tell, 2001, Nobeoka,1995). 
19 
 
Figure 4 – New learning mechanisms in R&D outsourcing and a new viable frontier 
Panel 3 of Figure 4 illustrates that moving the frontier enabled Fiat to do more with less. But 
how could this happen? What are the fundamental changes underlying the new approach? Fiat 
acknowledged that in order to improve the performance of its product development without 
insourcing design activities, it had to radically change its interpretation of the challenges of 
R&D outsourcing, and the organizational approaches used to tackle them.  
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Implications for implementing R&D outsourcing to avoid negative consequences: 
Moving beyond the “make or buy” choice 
Four take-away lessons can be learned from the novel organization Fiat had implemented as a 
response to the negative consequences it had incurred from massively outsourcing product 
development.  
The state of the art in research has moved beyond the short-term advantages of outsourcing 
such as access to the specialized competences of external parties, to recognize that 
competence decay due to lack of learning opportunities represents a crucial risk of 
outsourcing. Taking into account long-term consequences on the firm’s competences because 
of missed learning opportunities means to recognize a trade-off between short- and long-term 
consequences of outsourcing (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). Acknowledging this trade-off makes 
it an obvious challenge to address the long-term leg of the trade-off (Jacobides & Winter, 
2005). The first take-away is that to do so, the list of criteria for deciding about which tasks to 
outsource needs to be extended by the criterion of learning needs: keep in-house or in-source 
the tasks on which you need to develop and maintain competences.  
Overlooking this criterion risks incurring competence decay in the long-term. Always making 
it the dominant criterion, however, means to reduce outsourcing. This poses a seeming 
paradox: in the light of this paradox, it appears that the choice is only the degree of short-term 
benefits and risk of negative consequences in the long-term, which are tightly coupled. The 
second take-way is that the coupling can be softened up by allocating R&D tasks in-house vs. 
to suppliers along the temporal dimension. For instance, alternating between template and 
derivative development projects over time (which involved different organization of teams, 
different relations to suppliers, etc.), it is possible to draw on the short-term benefits of 
outsourcing while mitigating the risk of negative long-term consequences due to competence 
decay because of missed learning opportunities. The temporal dimension has been mentioned 
in prior research (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996, Boumgarden et al., 2012), but has not 
received much attention so far in theories of outsourcing.   
Considering temporal sequencing of different schemes of division of labor across firm 
boundaries is not just novel in the outsourcing literature. It represents a way to change the 
allocation of resources to development tasks, as well as of development tasks to suppliers, in 
ways other than adapting the range of tasks carried out permanently by the firm. Thus, it 
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enables changing the allocation of tasks within vs. beyond firm boundaries without changing 
vertical scope. This possibility is of great theoretical and practical importance because it 
represents a possibility for changing the allocation of tasks and resources without having to 
acquire supplier firms or teams of supplier engineers with the desired competences. It 
provides an important new alternative for managers, because adapting vertical scope is very 
costly. 
The final take-away is that managers would benefit from focusing their R&D outsourcing 
decisions not only on the ‘make or buy’ question. Framing the main issue in ‘make or buy’ 
terms carries the danger of overlooking one major risk, i.e., competence decay because of loss 
of learning opportunities or excessive insourcing of R&D activities in order to avoid such 
loss. As we have shown in the evidence from the case, such novel possibilities can also be 
very effective.  
Conclusion 
For the theoretical discussion concerning firm boundary design, the insights from the Fiat 
case add to the growing evidence of more differentiated boundary designs. In particular, they 
add a lever that firms can pull in firm boundary design which has not yet been identified in 
the discussion of the boundaries of the firm: shifting between different schemes of division of 
labor with suppliers over time. As we have described above, this particular form of ‘make-
and-buy’ (Parmigiani, 2007) has enabled Fiat to enjoy learning benefits as well as the benefit 
of being able to outsource the development of complete models to suppliers while making 
sure the final product conformed to Fiat’s ideas, so that the resulting models really felt like a 
Fiat.  
The novel solution, of course, is not a panacea and comes with its own negative side effects. 
The most notable one is that alternating project types over time might expose the firm to 
technological obsolescence of components and systems when they are applied in derivative 
projects. This problem can be particularly pronounced in industries characterized by faster 
technological obsolescence. This brings us to considerations concerning the boundary 
conditions of our findings.  
The novel organizational system that Fiat implemented showed a strong impact due to the fact 
that (1) Fiat develops products that are complex and whose design tasks are highly 
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interdependent (overall performance cannot be achieved through ex ante specifications of 
each single component/sub-system performance), (2) few standards have emerged in the 
industry (with the consequence that Fiat could not rely on standard interfaces to govern 
suppliers’ involvement after R&D outsourcing), and (3) Fiat can exploit the investments made 
on a template platform  throughout a range of derivative products.  
Further empirical analysis in different industrial contexts can add richness and precision to the 
research on novel ways of implementing make-and-buy and on how firms adapt their 
boundaries over time. 
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